

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE

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KINSHASA FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: MASS PFOR CG

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR
ZAIRE(S/S NO. 7619667)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AF-AMB. SEELYE

1. ISSUE: PLANNING FOR A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FOR ZAIRE HAS REACHED A POINT WHERE A DECISION MUST BE
MADE AMONG THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE AS A GAP
EXISTS BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRESIDENT
MOBUTU'S EXPECTATIONS. YOUR MEETING WITH MOBUTU ON
SEPTEMBER 21 OFFERS AN OCCASION TO COMMUNICATE THIS
DECISION.

2. BACKGROUND: THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE
REPEATEDLY SIGNALLED TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU--VIA HIGH LEVEL
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VISITS (INCL;DING IN PARTICULAR YOURS), GENERAL
ROCKWELL'S MISSION, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS--OUR UNDERSTANDI
OF HIS INCREASED SECURITY NEEDS AND OUR INTENTION TO HELP
MEET THEM. DURING THE SAME PERIOD WE HAVE PROMISED HIM

EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC SUPPORT, MUCH OF WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED, AND THE FIRST ELEMENT OF OUR PROMISED

MILITARY SUPPORT WAS THE INCREASE IN FMS CREDITS IN FY 1976

AT PRESENT WE ARE IMPLEMENTING TWO EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS IN ZAIRE UNDER THE FY 1976 FMS PROGRAM. WE ARE PROVIDING NEW 2 1/2 TON MILITARY TRUCKS AND ARE RESTORING TO OPERATIONAL CONDITION THE TWELVE APCS WE SENT TO ZAIRE LAST FALL. US ARMY TEAMS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE PROGRAMS ARRIVED IN ZAIRE WITHIN THE PAST WEEK AND ARE EXPECTED TO COMPLETE THEIR WORK IN ABOUT 18 WEEKS.

ON THE FINANCIAL SIDE WE HAVE AUTHORIZED 10.170 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS CREDITS AND GRANT MILITARY TRAINING FOR FY 1977. THE FY 1977 SECURITY ASSISTANCE BILL CONTAINS 28.0 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS CREDITS AND 2.5 MILLION DOLLARS IN GRANT MILITARY TRAINING. THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SLIGHTLY OVER 40 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE TQ AND FY 1977 WE BELIEVE WILL BE MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO MOBUTU DEPENDING UPON THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT OFFERED, THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE, AND THE PROMISE OF A CONTINUING AND MORE SOPHISTICATED LONGER TERM PROGRAM. GENERAL ROCKWELL'S MILITARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM SUBMITTED ITS REPORT TO DOD ON JUNE 17, 1976. BECAUSE--AS INSTRUCT --IT WAS PREPARED ON THE BASIS OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S BELIEF THAT AN IMMINENT MILITARY THREAT EXISTS, THE REPORT RECOMMENDS AN EXTENSIVE PROGRAM WHICH APPEARS NEITHER FINANCIALLY NOR TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE.

AN INTER-AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE ZAIRIAN SECURITY SITUATION HAS CONCLUDED THAT NO IMMEDIATE AND ONLY A VERY LIMITED MEDIUM-TERM MILITARY THREAT AGAINST ZAIRE EXISTS. DOD ALSO IS CONVINCED THAT THE ZAIRIAN
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ARMED FORCES CANNOT ABSORB LARGE AMOUNTS OF MODERN EQUIPMENT.

DOD HAS REVIEWED GENERAL ROCKWELL'S REPORT AND WILL FORWARD TO US THEIR CONCLUSIONS ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE JCS. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT DOD IS PROPOSING A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR ZAIRE WHICH IS CONSIDERABLY MORE MODEST THAN THAT RECOMMENDED BY ROCKWELL AND WHICH FALLS SHORT OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S REQUEST. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE PROPOSALS IS BOTH THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT TO BE PROVIDED AND THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE.

3. DOD RECOMMENDATIONS: THE DOD PROPOSAL, AWAITING CLEARANCE BY JCS, COVERS A TWELVE-YEAR PROGRAM AT AN

ESTIMATED COST OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS FOR US SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT AND RELATED TRAINING. THE PROGRAM IS BROKEN INTO TWO SEGMENTS: A FIVE YEAR INITIAL PACKAGE AND AN SEVEN YEAR COMPLETION PROGRAM. THE INITIAL PACKAGE IS DESIGNED TO MEET PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO DEAL WITH HIS PERCEIVED SECURITY SITUATION. THE SEVEN YEAR FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE IMPACT PACKAGE WITH THE FINAL RESULT OF A MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION (WITH A HELICOPTER SQUADRON), AN ARMORED CAR SCREENING FORCE PLUS SOME ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL UNITS.

SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND DOD ARE VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO PROVIDING EQUIPMENT WHICH ZAIRE CANNOT OPERATE OR MAINTAIN, ADDING TO THE LONG LIST OF INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY IN ZAIRE. APART FROM THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE IN ZAIRE (E.G. THE 12 APCs PROVIDED LAST FALL NOW ALL DEADLINED), DOD IS CONCERNED BY THE REPORTS OF CHINESE PROVIDED TANKS (27 OF WHICH ARRIVED WITHIN THE PAST FEW MONTHS AND ARE STILL STORED IN THE PORT) WHICH THE ZAIRIANS APPEAR UNABLE TO PLACE AND KEEP IN OPERATION. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT ALL AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE AIR FORCE ARE INOPERABLE EXCEPT FOR THE US PROVIDED CESSNA 150S WHICH HAVE JUST BEGUN TO ARRIVE.

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IN ADDITION THERE ARE PROBLEMS OF EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY; E.G. THE PRODUCTION SCHEDULE FOR M-60 TANKS IS BOOKED UNTIL 1980, REBUILT HELICOPTERS REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF THREE YEARS TO PREPARE, AND US HELICOPTER TRAINING SCHOOLS ARE FULLY BOOKED FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

GIVEN THESE CONSTRAINTS DOD WILL PROPOSE A FIVE YEAR IMPACT PACKAGE BUILT AROUND 56 V-150 COMMANDO ARMORED CARS EQUIPPED WITH ANTI-TANK GUNS (90 MM AND 105 MM RECOILESS RIFLES) FOR DELIVERY WITHIN 24 MONTHS AND A TANK COMPANY (10 M-60s) DELIVERED BEGINNING 36 MONTHS AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF THE LOA. DOD ARGUES THAT THE PROPOSED ARMORED SQUADRON WILL PROVIDE ZAIRE IMMEDIATELY WITH A DETERRENT FORCE, WHICH THEY CAN LATER MAKE PART OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, TURN OVER THE GENDARMERIE, OR USE AS A SCREENING FORCE FOR THEIR MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION. (SEE TAB A)

4. EVALUATION OF DOD RECOMMENDATION AND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES: WE ARE CONCERNED THAT DOD'S PROPOSAL, HOWEVER COMMENDABLE TECHNICALLY, WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DOES NOT

MATCH PROMISES GIVEN HIM AND DOES NOT SATISFY HIS
PERCEIVED SHORT-TERM NEED TO MEET AN IMMINENT MILITARY

THREAT. EMBASSY KINSHASA HAS POINTED OUT THAT A SHORT
LEAD TIME FOR DELIVERY OF TANKS IS A KEY ELEMENT IN
A MINIMALLY CREDIBLE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THEY HAVE
PROPOSED A QUICKER DELIVERY SCHEDULE, AND INCREASING
THE NUMBER OF TANKS TO TWENTY TO BE DELIVERED BETWEEN
THE 12TH AND 36TH MONTH OF THE PROGRAM.

EMBASSY KINSHASA ALSO STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THE INCLUSION
OF HELICOPTERS IN THE INITIAL PACKAGE. DOD, HOWEVER,
REMAINS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SUPPLYING HELICOPTERS
AT THIS TIME, SINCE NONE OF THE AIRCRAFT (HELICOPTERS
AND FIXED WING) SUPPLIED TO ZAIRE BY VARIOUS SUPPLIERS
ARE PRESENTLY FUNCTIONING. MOREOVER SINCE THE PRESENT
STOCK OF ZAIRIAN HELICOPTERS ARE FRENCH, DOD BELIEVES
WE SHOULD NOT MIX EQUIPMENT AT THIS TIME BUT RATHER
ENCOURAGE FRANCE TO MAINTAIN ITS AIRCRAFT AND PROVIDE
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NEW EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. (THE DOD TOTAL PACKAGE
DOES CALL FOR A HELICOPTER SQUADRON AS PART OF THE
MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION, BUT LATER IN THE PROGRAM.)

WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE APPARENT GAP BETWEEN THESE TWO
POSITIONS WITH DOD WORKING LEVEL OFFICERS AND HAVE
WORKED OUT A COMPRESSED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR
THE DOD IMPACT PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT SERVE THE PURPOSE.
IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF A
US ARMY TEAM TO COORDINATE IMPLEMENTATION, DELIVERY
OF THE ARMORED CAR SQUADRON AND A BATTERY OF TOWED
HOWITZERS BEGINNING IN THE 8TH MONTH, DELIVERY OF
THE FIRST TANK PLATOON (3 TANKS) IN THE 12TH MONTH,
DELIVERY OF THE REMAINDER OF THE TANK COMPANY (7 TANKS)
IN THE 24TH MONTH, FOLLOWED BY TWO MORE BATTERIES OF
HOWITZERS AND THE APC BATTALION DURING THE REST OF THE
FIVE YEAR PERIOD. (SEE TAB B).

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS REVISED INITIAL PACKAGE WILL
REQUIRE OBTAINING TANKS SOONER THAN IS POSSIBLE FROM
PRESENT DELIVERY SCHEDULE. IF A DECISION IS MADE TO DO
SO, WE COULD DIVERT TANKS FROM THE PRESENT DELIVERY
SCHEDULE DESTINED FOR OTHER CUSTOMERS (PROBABLY SOME
OF THE 75 ON ORDER FOR ISRAEL OR 150 ON ORDER FOR
SAUDI ARABIA FOR DELIVERY BEGINNING LATE 1977.)
ALTERNATIVELY, THERE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING
USED M-60 TANKS FROM IRAN. (THE IRANIANS ARE REPORTEDLY
REPLACING THEM WITH BRITISH CENTURIONS.)

THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTING THE DOD INITIAL PACKAGE
OR PROPOSING TO DOD AN ACCELERATED DELIVERY VERSION

OF THEIR PACKAGE, IS TO ASK DOD TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOW. THIS WOULD REQUIRE DRAWING FROM US ARMY STOCKS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DOD AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

FINALLY, MOBUTU HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY RUMSFELD. COOPERATION IN THIS AREA WOULD NATURALLY INVOLVE FRANCE (IN THE MILITARY SECRET

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AVIATION FIELD) AND BELGIUM (POSSIBLY IN THE NAVAL SECTOR OR WITH THE GENDARMES). IF YOU WISH TO PURSUE THIS MATTER, YOU MIGHT WISH TO TELL MOBUTU THAT WE WILL ACTIVELY PURSUE THOSE CONSULTATIONS.

5. OPTIONS: 1. THAT WE CONCUR WITH THE DOD RECOMMENDATION FOR A PHASED EQUIPMENT SUPPLY AND TRAINING PROGRAM 'HICH DOES NOT INCLUDE HELICOPTERS INITIALLY AND WHICH ALLOWS FOR NORMAL PRODUCTION DELIVERY OF TANKS THIRTY-SIX MONTHS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM.
-- ADVANTAGES - IT IS A TECHNICALLY SOUND PROGRAM, RELATED TO ZAIRIAN CAPABILITIES.

- WOULD EFFECTIVELY MEET ZAIRE'S SECURITY NEEDS AS EVALUATED BY THE USG.

-- DISADVANTAGES - PRESIDENT MOBUTU WILL NOT FIND THIS PROPOSAL SATISFACTORY IN LIGHT OF THE ASSURANCES HE HAS BEEN GIVEN.

2. THAT WE SPEED UP IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY PROGRAM. IN REGARD TO TANKS, THIS WOULD REQUIRE ASKING THE IRANIANS IF ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SUPPLY SOME OF THE M-60S CURRENTLY IN THEIR STOCKS OR BY DIVERTING M-60 TANKS CURRENTLY COMMITTED TO OTHER FOREIGN CUSTOMERS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THEM (E.G. ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA).
-- ADVANTAGES - WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESIDENT MOOUTU.

- IT STRIKES A BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND ZAIRIAN NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES.

-- DISADVANTAGES - IF IRANIAN M-60S ARE UNAVAILABLE, EQUIPMENT PROMISED TO OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES MUST BE DIVERTED, THEREBY ALTERING COMMITMENTS.

3. THAT WE ASK DOD TO EXPAND THE PACKAGE SIGNIFICANTLY BOTH IN TERMS OF AMOUNTS AND IN ACCELERATING DELIVERIES.

-- ADVANTAGES - WOULD BE MORE CERTAIN OF SATISFYING
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PRESIDENT MOBUTU THAT WE HAVE FULFILLED OUR COMMITMENT
TO HIM.

- WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SINCERELY FELT
SECURITY NEEDS OF OUR ALLIES ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED
BY THE USG.

-- DISADVANTAGES - WOULD REQUIRE DIVERSION OF EQUIPMENT
FROM US ARMY STOCKS, THEREBY REQUIRING CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL AND GOING AGAINST DOD DESIRES.

- WOULD INCREASE POSSIBILITY OF
CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
BECAUSE ZAIRE WOULD BE UNABLE TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN
EQUIPMENT WE CONTINUE TO SUPPLY DESPITE KNOWN SUB-STANDARD
PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY OF ZAIRIAN FORCES.

- MAY FURTHER DELAY USG RESPONSE TO
MOBUTU'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

6. RECOMMENDATION: THE BUREAU RECOMMENDS THAT YOU
REQUEST DOD TO REDESIGN ITS PROPOSED INITIAL PACKAGE
OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR ZAIRE ALONG THE LINES
OUTLINED IN OPTION 2, THAT IS, A COMPRESSED DELIVERY
SCHEDULE WHICH REPRESENTS AN OPTIMUM IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM.

APPROVE DIASPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, THAT YOU ASK THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TO RECONSIDER THE TECHNICAL LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
A MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROGRAM FOR ZAIRE TO PROVIDE FOR
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT,
AS DISCUSSED IN OPTION 3, REQUIRING A DRAWDOWN OF US
STOCKS.

ADDITIONALLY, THAT YOU AUTHORIZE A COMBINED STATE-DOD
APPROACH TO THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS TO DISCUSS
COORDINATION OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO
ZAIRE.

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APPROVE DISAPPROVE

TAB A

MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROGRAM FOR ZAIRE - ANTICIPATED DOD
RECOMMENDATION FOR INITIAL PACKAGE

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE ITEM

(MONTHS FROM ACCEPTANCE
OF LOA)

0-24	-ARMORED CAR SQUADRON (56 V-150 COMMANDO ARMORED CARS, EQUIPPED WITH VARIOUS WEAPONS INCLUDING ANTI-TANK GUNS PLUS SUPPORT TRUCKS AND JEEPS)
0-6	-SURVEY TEAM CONDUCTS APPRAISAL OF ZAIRIAN ABSORBITIVE CAPACITY FOR EQUIPMENT
36-48	-TRAINING OF ZAIRIAN PERSONNEL; -TANK PLATOON (THREE M-60 TANKS PLUS ONE TANK RETRIEVER); -MECHANIZED INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY (12 APCs EQUIPPED WITH RECOILESS RIFLES, MORTARS)
36-60	-TWO MECHANIZED INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANIES (24 APCs EQUIPPED AS ABOVE -REST OF TANK COMPANY (SEVEN M-60s -THREE BATTERIES TO TOWED ARTILLE (EIGHTEEN 105MM HOWITZERS)

NOTES:

1. PACKAGE IS FIVE-YEAR COMPONENT OF 12-YEAR PROGRAM,
TO COST APPROXIMATELY 30 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR FOR
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GROUND FORCE ELEMENTS.

2. TOTAL PROGRAM INCLUDES AIR FORCE (AIR DEFENSE) AND
NAVAL COMPONENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION BEGINNING IN THIRD
AND FOURTH YEARS.

3. INITIAL PACKAGE WILL PROVIDE REENFORCED CAVALARY
SQUADRON. PROGRAM FOR FOLLOW-ON 6-12 YEAR PERIOD
WILL BUILD ON THAT FORMATION TO LEVEL OF MECHANIZED
INFANTRY DIVISION PLUS ARMORED CAR SCREENING FORCE.

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